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The concern for witness reliability is not new to Evidence law.  
Since the Anglo-American adversarial system relies for accurate fact-
finding upon jurors who have no independent knowledge of the facts 
at issue, it is important for witnesses supplying evidence that will form 
the basis of such fact-finding to be reliable.1  Evidentiary submissions 
that raise issues of hearsay,2 first-hand knowledge,3 original 
documents,4 and others invoke rules that reflect a concern about 
reliability.  Expert testimony raises the same concern under Rule 
702.5 
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 1 RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES § 204 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 2 See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, advisory committee’s introductory note (noting as a 
purpose of the hearsay rule “to encourage the witness to do his best with respect to 
each of [the factors of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity], and to expose 
any inaccuracies which may enter in”). 
 3 See FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (citing McCormick for the 
following passage in describing the justification for the rule: “‘[T]he rule requiring 
that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have 
had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most 
pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable 
sources of information.’”). 
 4 See FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee’s note (noting that the best evidence 
“afforded substantial guarantees against inaccuracies and fraud”); see also 2 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 229 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (noting “the danger 
of mistransmitting critical facts which accompanies the use of written copies or 
recollection”). 
 5 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) (noting 
the concern of the common law with reliable sources of information as manifested in 
the personal knowledge and hearsay rules and explaining that the reliability 
requirement in 702 grows out of a concern about the wide latitude permitted the 
expert witness whose opinions need not be based on firsthand knowledge or 
observation). 
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In any of these contexts, perfectly reliable evidence would justify 
the jury’s absolute confidence in the truth of its contents and provide 
complete support for reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.6  Some cross-examination and all impeachment are efforts 
to diminish the perceived reliability of evidence in the hope that a 
fact-finder will discount its value.7 
THE LAW 
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,8 General Electric Co. v. Joiner,9 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,10 
and Congress in Rule 702 as amended in 2000, have attempted to 
delineate the parameters of reliable expert testimony.  Even before 
the 2000 amendments the concept of reliability was embedded in 
Rule 702.  That rule permitted an expert to give helpful scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.  It is the concept of 
knowledge in Rule 702 that embodied the idea of reliability as truth.  
The Supreme Court unearthed the buried idea of reliability in 
Daubert.11  In dispelling the notion of general acceptance as a 
prerequisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court 
expressed the assurance that admissibility of scientific evidence was 
not unlimited.12  It spelled out a judge’s screening function in such 
cases as involving the dual determination of relevancy and 
reliability.13  Since Daubert involved scientific evidence, the Court in 
the following terms discerned the reliability requirement in 702’s 
language sanctioning expert testimony about scientific knowledge: 
The subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . . 
knowledge.”  The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the 
 
 6 See 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 562 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “reliable” 
as “1.a. That may be relied upon; in which reliance or confidence may be put; 
trustworthy, safe, sure”). 
It also defines “trust” as “[c]onfidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute 
of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement . . . .”  18 Id. at 623. 
 7 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717  (3d Cir. 1994) 
(stating that credibility may have a bearing on the reliability of expert testimony); 
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 108-09, 389-90. 
 8 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 9 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 10 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 11 But see Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting The Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2015 (1994) (noting that the reliability approach developed 
five to seven years after the enactment of the rules and commenting that “there is an 
element of magic in the [Daubert] Court’s ‘discovery’ of [the reliability] analysis in 
Rule 702’s phrase ‘scientific knowledge’”). 
 12 509 U.S. at 589. 
 13 Id. 
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methods and procedures of science.  Similarly, the word 
“knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.  The term “applies to any body of 
known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or 
accepted as truths on good grounds.”14 
That the “good grounds” (reliability) supporting scientific knowledge 
are derived from the scientific method is expressed as follows: 
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or 
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed 
testimony must be supported by an appropriate validation—i.e., 
“good grounds,” based on what is known.  In short, the 
requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific 
knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.15 
In Daubert, the Court is careful to make it clear that its discussion 
centered upon scientific rather than “technical or other specialized 
knowledge.”16  However, a change in the adjective modifying 
knowledge does not change the central concern of reliability—that 
such knowledge (scientific, technical or specialized other) be capable 
of acceptance as truth on good grounds.  It also seems clear that the 
Daubert factors showing scientific reliability—testability, peer review, 
error rate, controlling standards, and general acceptance—might 
prove useful individually, collectively, or in some combination with 
other factors in determining the reliability of technical or other 
specialized knowledge.17  Always, the point of the inquiry is whether 
the knowledge in question is capable of acceptance as truth on good 
grounds. 
The district court in Joiner found that the opinions of plaintiff’s 
experts were not based on reliable scientific knowledge.18  In the 
court’s view the animal and epidemiological studies relied upon by 
these experts to show a link between the plaintiff’s exposure to PCBs 
and his development of small cell lung cancer did not sufficiently 
support the opinions.19 Under an “abuse of discretion” standard the 
Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling of inadmissibility.  
The Court affirmed the district court’s discretion to find an expert’s 
opinion to be an unsupported assertion, where “too great an 
analytical gap [exists] between the data and the opinion proffered,” 
 
 14 Id. at 589-90 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 15 Id. at 590 (footnote omitted). 
 16 Id. n.8. 
 17 See id. at 593-94.  This point seems adumbrated in the Court’s emphasis on the 
flexibility of the reliability inquiry under Rule 702.  Id. at 594. 
 18 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997). 
 19 Id. at 144-45. 
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and said that “abuse of discretion” is the proper standard whether the 
trial court’s decision is to admit or exclude scientific evidence.20 
In Kumho, the adjective modifying “knowledge” changed.21  
Unlike Daubert and Joiner where the issues involved the reliability of 
scientific evidence, Kumho considered the reliability of non-scientific 
expert testimony.22  For reasons grounded in the language of Rule 
702,23 the rationale of the reliability element of the rule,24 and the 
difficulty of distinguishing between “scientific” on the one hand and 
“technical or other specialized knowledge” on the other, the Court 
held that the judge’s gatekeeping function applied to all expert 
testimony.  To reinforce this conclusion, the Court noted the 
common approach among all experts to “tie observations to 
conclusions through . . . ‘general truths derived from . . . specialized 
experience’” and the role of the judge’s reliability determination in 
helping the jury evaluate that “foreign experience.” 25  Elaborating 
upon the requirements of Rule 702 the Court said: 
The Rule, in respect to all such matters, “establishes a standard of 
evidentiary reliability.”  It “requires a valid . . . connection to the 
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”  And where 
such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their 
application are called sufficiently into question, the judge must 
determine whether the testimony has “a reliable basis in the 
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”26 
The Court also reaffirmed the flexibility of the reliability 
determination, the trial court’s discretion to consider one or more of 
the Daubert factors or others in reaching the reliability determination, 
and the applicability of Joiner’s abuse of discretion standard to trial 
 
 20 Id. at 146. 
 21 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 22 Id. at 141.  
 23 In capturing the essence of the Daubert analysis of reliability, the Court focused 
as follows on the noun, knowledge, rather than the adjective, scientific, in Rule 702: 
In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule’s word “knowledge,” 
not the words (like “scientific”) that modify that word, that “establishes 
a standard of evidentiary reliability.” . . .  Hence, as a matter of 
language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to all “scientific,” 
“technical,” or “other specialized” matters within its scope. 
Id. at 147. 
 24 On this point the Court reiterated the expert witness’s “testimonial latitude” 
that is “unavailable to other witnesses on the ‘assumption that the expert’s opinion 
will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’”  Id. at 
138 (citations omitted). 
 25 Id. at 148-49 (quoting from Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations 
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)). 
 26 Id. at 149 (internal citations omitted). 
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court reliability rulings.27 
Whether the engineering testimony of Kumho was reliable and 
capable of acceptance as truth on good grounds depended on the 
nature of the opinion and its basis.  The expert in Kumho had 
concluded that a defect rather than misuse in the right rear tire of 
the minivan that plaintiff had been driving caused it to blow out, 
killing one passenger and severely injuring others.  The issue boiled 
down to whether overdeflection (misuse) or a defect had caused the 
tread of the tire to separate from the inner steel-belted carcass, 
causing the blow-out.  The expert asserted the latter cause.  In 
support of this opinion the expert set forth both a general theory and 
a specific theory.  The general theory held that in the absence of 
abuse B determined by the expert’s visual and tactile inspection of 
the tire B such a separation is caused by a defect.  Under the specific 
theory, unless two of four possible signs of misuse (overdeflection) 
could be shown, a conclusion that a defect caused the blowout must 
follow.28 
In deciding to affirm the district court’s finding that the expert’s 
testimony was not reliable, the Court focused its critical analysis on 
the grounds of the expert’s conclusion.  It cited evidence in the 
record that raised doubts about the reliability of the expert’s use of 
the two-factor test and visual/tactile inspection.29  Some aspects of this 
evidence bore upon the credibility of the witness.30  Others focused 
on a critique of the expert’s stated methodology.31  After considering 
 
 27 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42. 
 28 Id. at 143, 154.  The expert cited as the symptoms of overdeflection: 
(a) tread wear on the tire’s shoulder that is greater than the tread wear 
along the tire’s center . . . (b) signs of a “bead groove,” where the beads 
have been pushed too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the 
tire’s rim, . . . (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of 
deterioration, such a discoloration, . . . (d) marks on the tire’s rim 
flange. 
Id. at 144. 
 29 Id. at 154-57. 
 30 For example, the Court noted the inconsistency between the expert’s claim 
that visual/tactile inspection permitted him “to ascertain with some certainty the 
abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences, 
but insufficiently precise to tell ‘with any certainty’ from the tread wear whether a 
tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.”  Id. at 155.  It also 
noted the insufficiency of the expert’s opportunity to observe the tire, having 
inspected it for the first time and for only a few hours on the morning of the 
deposition and the inconsistencies between the expert’s signed report and his 
deposition and the contradiction between the expert’s report on tread depth and an 
opposing expert’s undisputed measurements.  Id. 
 31 The Court noted the “‘subjective[ness]’ of his mode of analysis in response to 
questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between 
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whether the expert’s methodology could withstand scrutiny on its 
own terms, the Court also approved of the trial court’s next steps of 
determining whether any of the Daubert factors pointed to reliability, 
whether the trial court’s own analysis “‘revealed . . . countervailing 
factors operating in favor of admissibility which could outweigh those 
identified in Daubert,’” 32 and whether the parties cited any factors 
favoring admissibility.33  In its independent assessment of whether the 
trial court had abused its discretion by finding the expert’s testimony 
unreliable, the Court compared the expert’s methodology to that 
used by other experts in the industry.  It also considered any 
validation of the expert’s approach in the literature of the field, and 
whether the expert’s methodology reflected “the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field.”34  In Kumho, the Court sanctioned an approach to 
determining the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony that 
tested whether the opinion was capable of acceptance as truth on 
good grounds.  The grounds included the expert’s credibility, the 
soundness and application of his methodology, the Daubert factors, 
and any other relevant factors. 
After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert, Joiner, and 
Kumho, Congress amended Rule 702, effective 2000, as follows to 
incorporate the teachings of Daubert and Kumho: 
If scientific, technical, other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.35 
The legislative history contained in the Advisory Committee Note 
(“CAN”) makes it clear that the amendment was intended to affirm 
“the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and [provide] some general 
standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and 
 
a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it 
had been” his failure to examine many similar tires to determine the significance of 
the bead groove even though he testified that such an examination would have been 
appropriate.  Id. at 155. 
 32 Id. at 156. 
 33 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156. 
 34 Id. at 152. 
 35 FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added to highlight amended provisions). 
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helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.”36  The ACN also reiterates 
Kumho’s holding that the gatekeeper function is applicable to 
scientific as well as non-scientific expert testimony.  However, the 
drafters of the amendment recognized that the reliability 
determination would vary depending upon the nature of the 
proffered expertise, saying the following: 
Some types of expert testimony will be more objectively verifiable, 
and subject to the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and 
publication, than others.  Some types of expert testimony will not 
rely on anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be 
evaluated by reference to other standard principles attendant to 
the particular area of expertise.  The trial judge in all cases of 
proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly grounded, 
well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted.37 
In addition, the ACN endorses not only the Daubert factors for 
assessing reliability, but also cites other factors used by courts and 
other uncited factors as relevant to the determination.38 
The Supreme Court cases and the Rule 702 amendment and 
legislative history devote much attention to the judge’s performance 
of the Rule 104(a) gatekeeping function of determining the 
reliability of expert testimony.  However, they only hint at how to 
recognize reliability for purposes of fulfilling the function.  Noting 
that the proponent’s burden is demonstrating “by a preponderance 
of evidence that [experts’] opinions are reliable rather than ‘correct,’ 
the ACN of the Rule 702 amendments quotes with approval a judicial 
statement that the “evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower 
than the merits standard of correctness.”  The ACN also explains that 
“the rejection of expert testimony should be the exception rather 
than the rule,” citing Daubert language suggesting that “shaky” expert 
testimony should be admitted and subjected to attack by the 
adversarial elements of cross-examination, conflicting evidence, and 
the burden of proof.  The reliability determination is not to be 
confused with the sufficiency determination that the trial judge bases 
on the record as a whole.39  The dual obligations of reliability and 
 
 36 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to amended Rule 702. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Some of these factors are whether the testimony grows out of research 
conducted independent of litigation, whether the expert’s extrapolation from an 
accepted premise is unjustifiably broad, whether the expert has accounted for 
obvious alternative explanations, whether the expert’s degree of care matches that of 
his professional practice, whether the expertise is recognized as giving reliable 
opinions such as those offered by the expert.  Id. 
 39 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility 
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 189 (2003). 
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relevancy determinations under Rule 702 make it clear that reliability 
is different from relevancy.  Hence, the low standard of relevancy will 
not suffice to establish reliability.40 
Like Rule 403, the reliability determination seems to require 
trial judges to demand more of expert testimony than simple 
relevancy.  Yet the Court in Daubert does not explicitly tie the 
reliability determination to 403 analysis—it simply instructs trial 
judges to be “mindful of other applicable rules.”  However, the Court 
specifically cites Rule 403 and endorses Judge Weinstein’s observation 
that Rule 403 gives judges more control over expert witnesses than 
laywitnesses because of the potential prejudice associated with the 
former.41 
Before the Court decided Daubert, Judge Becker had discussed 
the relationship between 702 and 403 in United States v. Downing,42 a 
case relied upon by the Daubert Court.  In Downing, Judge Becker said 
the following: 
After assessing the reliability of the evidence, the court must also 
weigh any danger that the evidence might confuse or mislead the 
jury.  It may seem paradoxical to suggest that scientific evidence 
based on principles bearing substantial indicia of reliability could 
confuse rather than assist the jury, but we do not doubt that this 
may be so, in some cases.  One example might involve a 
technique which has “assume[d] a posture of mythic infallibility” 
among lay persons, or at least one whose shortcomings are, for 
some reason, unlikely to be effectively communicated to the jury.  
The degree to which an unwarranted “aura of reliability” attaches 
to scientific evidence will naturally vary with the type of 
evidence.43 
Later in the Downing decision, the court acknowledged that its 702 
analysis incorporated “to some extent a consideration of the dangers, 
particularly the danger of unfair prejudice, enumerated in Fed. R. 
Evid. 403.”44  In a post-Daubert case, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litigation (Paoli II),45 Judge Becker recalled his pre-Daubert discussion 
in Downing of the relationship between 702 and 403, saying that the 
point in Downing was that 702 “partly incorporates Rule 403 analysis 
 
 40 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 reads, “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 41 509 U.S. at 595. 
 42 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 43 Id. at 1239 (internal citations omitted). 
 44 Id. at 1242. 
 45 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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but leaves some room for Rule 403 to operate independently.”46  He 
went on to describe how the Daubert Court treated the Downing view 
of this relationship: 
In Daubert, the Supreme Court seems to have inverted our view 
that much of Rule 403 analysis conflates into Rule 702; rather the 
Court seems to have conflated the confusion/overwhelming 
impact prong of our Rule 702 analysis into its Rule 403 analysis.  
The Daubert Court did not mention the confusion/overwhelming 
prong when discussing Rule 702 but did provide support for 
application of essentially similar analysis under the rubric of Rule 
403.47 
Since degree of reliability has a bearing upon the probative 
value of expert testimony, and the risk of misleading the jury and 
other 403 factors might lead to exclusion under Rule 403 as noted by 
the Court in Daubert, the reliability determination may simply fold 
into the 403 analysis creating a sliding scale of reliability under 702.48  
Under this approach, if the degree of reliability (probative value) 
sufficiently offsets the Rule 403 risks associated with the expert 
testimony, the evidence is reliable enough to be admissible under 
403.  Even expert testimony of the highest risk would not lead to 
exclusion if the expert testimony were highly reliable.49  This 
determination would be consistent with the demand for more than 
simple relevancy in reaching reliability determinations and the need 
to observe the distinction between reliability and sufficiency.  
Although the Court in Daubert perceives a relationship between 403 
and the reliability determination under 702 and moves it, perhaps, 
one step beyond Downing, the recognition of reliability as a factor in 
determining the probative value of this species of evidence under 403 
analysis remains underdeveloped. 
THE ARGUMENTS 
In Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, Professor Dale Nance’s 
 
 46 Judge Becker used as an example of this relationship the exclusion of “an 
expert’s critique of eyewitness testimony even though the critique met the 
requirements of Rule 702 if there was evidence of defendant’s guilt other than 
eyewitness testimony which would make efforts to criticize eyewitness testimony a 
waste of time.”  Id. at 746. 
 47 Id. at 746-47. 
 48 See Calvin William Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes 
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 585-89 (1984) 
(describing proof of other crimes as a sliding scale of proof). 
 49 See Newell H. Blakely, Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 
317 (1993) (including a table showing high probative value offsetting high, mid, or 
low prejudice). 
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project is to provide “a careful analysis of the contours and functions 
of the reliability concept . . . and its relationship to the purposes of 
admissibility rules.”50  He argues generally that “courts and 
commentators should disavow an all-or-nothing concept of reliability” 
in favor of a concept that recognizes reliability as a non-binary 
variable characteristic, thus recognizing that the binary mode of 
expression in Rule 702 indicates the results of an unarticulated 
analytical framework.51 
Nance argues in the following terms that 702 reliability instead 
calls for a comparative evaluation of expert testimony: 
Much more important in articulating a meaningful content for 
the reliability requirement of Rule 702, and more likely to result 
in the exclusion of proffered expertise, is the idea that evidence 
may be excluded to encourage the presentation of better 
evidence, evidence that is more probative, or less costly for the 
tribunal, or otherwise presenting a more favorable balance 
between the two.52 
Specifically, he argues that the reliability element of 702 requires the 
trial judge to secure the best (most reliable) evidence that is 
reasonably available to the proponent of expert testimony.53  For 
Nance, this approach cures many ills including, importantly, the 
misplaced concern about jury credulity.54 
Professor Nance recognizes the affinity between his suggested 
approach and Rule 403.  He acknowledges that 403 analysis addresses 
traditional concerns about reliability,55 and he concedes that as a well-
understood rule, 403 is a good starting point for 702 analysis.56  He 
also acknowledges McCormick’s entreaty that balancing the probative 
value and prejudice of scientific evidence “offers a more honest and 
sensitive basis for making admissibility decisions than the more 
cramped tests that have characterized this area of the law.”57  
However, Professor Nance reads the cases and Rule 702 as requiring 
a content for reliability that is distinctive from 403 analysis.58  A 
 
 50 Nance, supra note 39, at 192. 
 51 Id. at 193. 
 52 Id. at 240. 
 53 Id. at 225. 
 54 Id. at 227. 
 55 Id. at 224 (identifying concerns about jury ability to properly assess probative 
value, conservation of jury and fact-finder resources, and the availability of better 
evidence). 
 56 Nance, supra note 226. 
 57 Id. at 220 (referring to 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 203). 
 58 Referring to the quote from MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, Nance says, “How then 
shall we complete the analysis in such a way as to give due respect to the teachings of 
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careful search of Daubert yields little support for such a view.  Indeed, 
Nance, in dispelling the notion of jury credulity and advocating the 
use of 403, points to the Daubert language affirming the role of 403 in 
excluding unduly prejudicial, confusing or misleading evidence.59  By 
reminding trial judges “assessing a proffer of expert scientific 
testimony under Rule 702” to be mindful of other applicable rules, 
the Court affirms a relationship between 702 and 403 and endorses 
the following view of Judge Weinstein: 
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading 
because of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of this risk, the 
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force 
under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over 
experts than over lay witnesses.  The judge may insist, for 
example, on strong guarantees that tests relied on by an expert 
were properly conducted since a careless laboratory is a terrible 
hazard to justice.60 
The insistence on the proper conduct of tests that Judge Weinstein 
described in the example seems to be an effort to establish the 
reliability (probative value) of the expert’s testimony.  The 
counterweight of possible prejudice that might lead to exclusion 
under 403 is what makes the admissibility finding essentially the same 
as the sufficient reliability finding under 702.  It is this analysis, 
endorsed by the Daubert Court, that Judge Weinstein used in the 
Agent Orange litigation, where he excluded animal studies with the 
following reasoning: 
There is no evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to the far higher 
concentrations involved in both the animal and industrial 
exposure studies.  The animal studies are not helpful in the 
instant cases because they involve different biological species.  
They are of so little probative force and are so potentially 
misleading as to be inadmissible.61 
In this pre-Daubert case, Judge Weinstein, discussing the trend toward 
replacing Frye analysis with 702 analysis, said that the “general 
acceptance” standard governing the admissibility of novel scientific 
evidence had been replaced by “a balancing of the relevance, 
reliability, and helpfulness of the evidence against the likelihood of 
 
the Supreme Court and the mandate of Congress in amended Rule 702?”  Id. 
 59 509 U.S. at 595. 
 60 Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not 
Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992).  The Court’s endorsement of this view also 
seems to evince a concern about jury credulity that Professor Nance perceived in the 
Court’s opinion.  See Nance, supra note 39, at 227-28. 
 61 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). 
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waste of time, confusion and prejudice.”62 Judge Weinstein 
elaborated, “[w]hen either the expert’s qualification or his testimony 
lie at the periphery of what the scientific community considers 
acceptable, special care should be exercised in evaluating the 
reliability and probative worth of the proffered testimony under 
Rules 703 and 403.”63  This discussion explicitly links reliability and 
probative value as part of the 403 analysis.  Indeed, Professor Nance 
points to this connection in making the observation that “expertise 
that is very unreliable may be excluded under Rule 403 as simply a 
waste of time.”64 
Yet the reliability determination under 702 does involve a 
distinct brand of 403 analysis.  Expert testimony raises a special 
concern under 403, because its terms must apply to specialized 
knowledge rather than lay knowledge.  And reliability is an 
idiosyncratic measure of expert testimony’s probative value.  Daubert’s 
five-factor reliability analysis purports to help judges ask the right 
questions in assessing the probative value of expert testimony.  It is 
one thing to determine the probative value of an earlier similar theft 
offered to show the existence of intent to commit a charged theft.65  
Judges can focus on the similarity of the circumstances and other 
factors and reach a fairly routine assessment of probative value.  It is 
quite another to determine the probative value of an opinion that 
Bendectin can cause birth defects based partially on the reanalysis of 
previously published epidemiological studies.66  The Daubert and 702 
factors help judges to conduct that more complicated assessment of 
probative value. 
Moreover, the potential for unfair prejudice and misleading the 
jury always lurks with the admission of expert testimony.67  As already 
noted, Professor Nance points out that expert testimony might be 
excluded under 403 “as simply a waste of time.”68  He also observes 
that expert testimony may require “greater judicial management or 
monitoring.”69  Why this heightened burden?  Nance cites the risk 
 
 62 611 F. Supp at 1242. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Nance, supra note 39, at 231. 
 65 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 66 See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (involving birth defects caused by 
Bendectin). 
 67 See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 717 (3d 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); In re “Agent 
Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 68 Nance, supra note 39, at 231. 
 69 Id. at 232.  Judge Becker identifies this concern as an independent 403 
concern that does  not involve an overlap with 702.  See supra note 46 and 
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factors of greater manipulability and the “production” of expert 
testimony, characteristics of expert testimony that are checked in 
non-expert testimony by the requirement of personal knowledge.70  
Using the reliability factors as tools, Daubert insists upon a balancing 
analysis that recognizes the special probative components of expert 
testimony as well as the inherent risks associated with such testimony. 
The specialized character of 403 analysis involving expert 
testimony (the use of Daubert factors) is one reason that the 702 
reliability overlay is distinctive from the 403 analysis of non-expert 
testimony.71  A second reason is the burden of proof.  The opponent 
 
accompanying text. 
 70 Responding to his own question concerning the need for heightened scrutiny 
of expert testimony, Nance reasons: 
I am inclined to believe that the answer lies in the greater 
manipulability of such evidence, as compared to most non-expert 
testimony.  The supply of non-expert testimony, limited as it is by the 
requirement of first-hand or “personal” knowledge, tends to be fixed 
by the litigated events.  Typically, only a small number of persons will 
have witnessed the events being litigated.  For practical purposes, 
expert testimony knows no such limitation.  When a matter is thought 
by counsel to be amenable to expert assistance, there are often 
numerous specializations and hundreds or thousands of practitioners 
thereof who might be called to testify.  Data can often be gathered and 
experiments can sometimes be conducted in anticipation of trial.  Put 
simply, expert testimony is produced in a way that most non-expert 
testimony is not, coaching of lay witnesses notwithstanding.  And there 
are obvious and powerful distorting and biasing forces at work in this 
production process, much of which occurs after the events being 
litigated and with an eye toward trial. 
Nance, supra note 39, at 232 (footnotes omitted). 
 71 In advocating a standard not simply redundant of Rule 403 Professor Nance 
cites a familiar principle of statutory construction and expresses skepticism that the 
Supreme Court in Daubert simply intended “to deliver the message that trial courts 
have been improperly applying Rule 403 in the context of expert testimony.”  Id. at 
226.  However, 702 viewed as a specialized application of 403 is not simply redundant 
of the typical 403 analysis.  The difference lies in the nature of the evidence rather 
than the rule.  Nance acknowledges the propriety of a heightened burden for the 
admissibility of expert testimony because of its “greater manipulability” when 
compared to non-expert testimony.  Id. at 232.  The Court in Daubert evinces a similar 
concern about the vulnerability of the jury in the face of expertise, when it 
enunciated criteria that would insulate the jury from this undue influence by 
safeguarding reliability.  The Court generated the Daubert factors, even though it 
dismissed concerns about the abandonment of the Frye test as growing out of an 
“overly pessimistic [view] about the capabilities of the jury.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-
96; see Nance, supra note 39, at 228.  Perhaps most importantly, the Court adopted 
Judge Weinstein’s observation about the powerful and misleading quality of expert 
evidence and the greater control that Rule 403 gives judges over experts than non-
experts.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.  Moreover, as Judge Becker suggested in Downing 
“[t]he degree to which an unwarranted ‘aura of reliability’ attaches to scientific 
evidence will naturally vary with the type of evidence.”  753 F.2d at 1239.  While jury 
credulity may not be a significant problem with scientific trace evidence, see Dale A. 
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of admissibility has the burden of persuasion in cases dealing with 
non-expert testimony.72  This is a heavy burden, since the rule favors 
admissibility and the opponent bears the risk of non-persuasion.73  
However, the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of 
proving sufficient reliability to offset 403 risks.74  The balancing 
standard under 403 does not change.75  But, if the judge is at or below 
equipoise in determining whether the testimony sufficiently offsets 
those risks to warrant admitting the testimony, the proponent loses 
and the evidence is excluded.  This heightened burden on the 
proponent of expert testimony under 702 eases the exclusion burden 
of the opponent under 403.76 
It is also easier to see under a 403 analysis that the 403 dangers 
set a minimum threshold of reliability, one that does not fit Professor 
Nance’s description of “an invariant threshold that applies across 
disciplines and across litigation contexts.”77  Rather, it varies with the 
 
Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace 
Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002), it may well be a substantial problem with polygraph 
evidence.  See discussion of the polygraph cases, infra notes 125-43 and 
accompanying text. 
 72 See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 
403.02[1] (8th ed. 2002) (describing rule 403 as creating a presumption); see also 
ALLEN, supra note 1, at 873 (explaining the operation of presumptions that shift the 
burden of proof to the opponent of the evidence). 
 73 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 336. 
 74 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH ISSUES § 1-3.1.2 (2002). 
 75 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states, “Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  FED. 
R. EVID. 403. 
 76 Nance applauds this function of the burden of proof under 702 in placing the 
“stricter demands of Daubert [and] Kumho Tire” on the proponent of expert 
testimony.  Nance, supra note 39, at 235.  However, for Nance this burden would only 
seem to be triggered where the proponent fails to offer more reliable expertise.  
Noting that the proponent has the burden to establish reliability, Nance says: 
Applying this idea here, if the trial judge concludes that the challenged 
expertise is discernibly less reliable than other expertise offered by the 
proponent, then the burden would rest on the proponent to convince 
the judge that it would be a mistake to ignore the challenged expertise 
because its consideration will materially assist the trier of fact to render 
an appropriate verdict within the constraints imposed by the process of 
trial.  Doubt on the matter would be resolved in favor of exclusion, 
reversing the burden as compared to Rule 403.  Distinguishing this 
analysis from that of Rule 403 would help to maintain the 
representational viewpoint described earlier. 
Id. 
 77 Id. at 221. 
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characteristics of each proffer.78 
The idea of a specialized 403 analysis is not inconsistent with 
Professor Nance’s better evidence principle.  While carefully crafting 
his argument for a distinctive analysis of reliability under 702, 
Professor Nance rejects a standard that is “simply redundant of Rule 
403.”79  He dismisses the notion that the Supreme Court in Daubert 
simply “intend[ed] to deliver the message that trial courts have been 
improperly applying Rule 403 in the context of expert testimony” and 
notes a “general consensus that Daubert did not adopt the position 
advanced most conspicuously by Dean McCormick.”80  For Nance 
what gives meaningful content to the reliability requirement of 702 
“is the idea that evidence may be excluded to encourage the 
presentation of better evidence, evidence that is more probative or 
less costly for the tribunal, or otherwise presenting a more favorable 
balance between the two.”81  He notes that “[t]his idea is present in a 
wide variety of rules, including Rule 403.”82  Indeed, the ACN for 403 
concludes with the following sentence: “The availability of other 
means of proof may also be an appropriate factor [in reaching a 
decision whether to exclude evidence under 403].”83  Professor Nance 
makes a persuasive case for giving prominence to the existence of 
better evidence in reaching the reliability determination.84  However, 
the analysis is likely to be less confusing to judges and more faithful 
to the spirit of Daubert, Kumho, and the 702 amendments if its 403 
 
 78 This observation also has implications for Nance’s view that in the absence of 
available alternatives, the court should admit the proffer.  See David L. Faigman, 
Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 253 (2003). 
 79 Nance, supra note 39, at 226. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 240. 
 82 In noting support for this point, Nance cites United States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 
172 (1997), which applied this understanding of 403 to hold that the trial court 
abused its discretion by not accepting a less prejudicial stipulation rather than the 
more prejudicial conviction record of the defendant.  It should be noted that the 
existence of a better evidence alternative in Old Chief reduced the probative value of 
the prosecutor’s submission, making exclusion more likely under 403, much like the 
absence of Daubert factors in a 702 reliability ruling might operate. 
 83 See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243 (“The availability of other methods that would 
serve the purposes for which the appellant seeks to introduce expert testimony may 
also serve to justify exclusion under Rule 403 . . . .”). 
 84 Professor Nance bases this reliability requirement on the courts’ “need to be 
demanding consumers of expertise, especially those kinds of expertise that find their 
reason for existence in the demand for expert testimony.”  Nance, supra note 39, at 
240.  He adds that the better evidence consideration “represents the primary, if not 
exclusive argument structure appropriate for the reliability inquiry of Rule 702.”  Id. 
at 241. 
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provenance is clear. 
Professors David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, and 
Joseph Sanders have adopted a similar better evidence principle: 
[W]e do endorse a better evidence principle in our analyses of 
certain issues in the law of expert testimony.  That is to say, we 
believe that there are circumstances in which a court properly 
may exclude proffered evidence when other evidence of greater 
probative value is or should be available.85 
Like Nance, these professors believe that a better evidence principle 
will produce the beneficial effects of increased accuracy in factfinding 
as well as enhanced research and expert knowledge.86 
While they describe Daubert as raising the bar to admissibility by 
placing a heavier cognitive burden on judges,87 they quote Judge 
Weinstein’s analysis in the Agent Orange litigation as an example of 
courts requiring better evidence.88  As already pointed out, Judge 
Weinstein in that case used a 403 analysis in ruling the animal studies 
inadmissible.89 
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried in A Final Comment—The 
Importance of the Procedural Framework,90 responds to the better evidence 
principle proposed by Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks and Sanders, 
taking delight in their rejection of a “best evidence test” and agreeing 
with their analytical outcomes in exemplary cases where they applied 
the better evidence principle.91  However, Professor Imwinkereid 
argues that such a better evidence principle is unnecessary to the 
analysis and that the announcement of a better evidence principle 
“further complicate[s] the analysis of the admissibility of scientific 
testimony.”92  In nicely setting forth the procedural elements of 
judicial reliability factfinding under 104(a), Imwinkelried 
acknowledges the significance to this inquiry of the presence of 
better evidence.93  He also indicates that the judge, in accordance 
with 104(a), evaluates the proponent’s foundation, laid “as a means 
 
 85 David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under 
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 654 (2000) (emphasis in the 
original). 
 86 Id. at 667. 
 87 Id. at 656. 
 88 Id. at 659. 
 89 See In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1241. 
 90 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural 
Framework, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000). 
 91 Id. at 669. 
 92 Id. at 670. 
 93 Id. at 678-79 
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to the end of ensuring reliability,”94 for sufficient probative value.95  
Though Professor Imwinkelried does not mention 403 in this piece, it 
is implicit in his discussion.96 
Professor Michael H. Graham in The Expert Witness Predicament: 
Determining ‘Reliable’ Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and 
Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,97 identifies 
two meanings of the term “reliable” as used in Daubert and Kumho: (1) 
“‘reliable’ . . . taken to mean that the explanative theory [theory, 
technique, reasoning, methodology, etc.] actually works, i.e., 
produces a correct, accurate, truthful, or valid conclusion,”98 and (2) 
“‘reliable’ refer[ring] to meriting confidence worthy of dependence 
or reliance, i.e., possesses sufficient assurance of correctness to 
warrant acceptance by the trier of fact.”99  He notes that the two 
definitions call for separate analyses and criticizes both Daubert and 
Kumho for creating confusion by using both meanings.100  While 
approving of the trial and appellate courts’ apparent favoring of the 
second definition, Graham never identifies that definition as part of 
the assessment of probative value in the 403 analysis.101 
 
 94 Id. at 671. 
 95 Id. at 675. 
 96 In an earlier article to which Faigman, supra note 84, responds, Professor 
Imwinkelried argued that it is appropriate for the opponent to point out the absence 
of the best evidence to attack the legal sufficiency or weight of scientific testimony, 
but not its admissibility—“either an order of preference among types of proffered 
scientific evidence or a regulation of the sufficiency of the foundation for proffered 
scientific testimony.”  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should The Courts Incorporate A Best 
Evidence Rule Into The Standard Determining The Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: 
Enough Is Enough Even When It Is Not The Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 49 (1999).  
In that article Professor Imwinkelried expressed the link between the reliability 
foundational requirement and probative value as follows: 
Faced with a foundational objection, the trial judge must determine 
whether the proponent’s predicate has enough probative worth to 
justify the proffered opinion.  The judge can make that determination 
if he or she decides whether the expert has properly applied the 
scientific methodologies and, if so, how significant the expert’s 
findings are. 
Id. at 47. 
 97 Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining ‘Reliable’ Under 
the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000). 
 98 Id. at 319, 336. 
 99 Id. at 336. 
 100 Id. at 336-37. 
 101 Professor Nance endorses Professor Graham’s approval of the second 
definition as a variable rather than dichotomous approach to reliability.  Nance, 
supra note 39, at 222.  However, Nance ultimately finds Graham’s “sufficient 
assurances” definition unsatisfactory due to the risk of confusion with “sufficiency,” 
its affinity with the Frye test and its problems, and its failure to account for the better 
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In Daubert: Interpreting The Federal Rules of Evidence,102 Professor 
Paul C. Giannelli argued that a relevancy approach that would treat 
reliability as an aspect of probative value “differs significantly from 
the reliability approach adopted in Daubert and it does not depend on 
Rule 702.”103  Professor Giannelli’s rejection of the relevancy 
approach appears to be based in part on Professor Strong’s 
articulation of it as follows: 
[S]cientific evidence, like other evidence, requires the striking of 
a balance between the probative worth of the evidence and its 
capacity to confuse or prejudice the jury . . . .  [I]n the case of 
scientific evidence the court will generally be forced to accept the 
probative value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies 
it to be.104 
Referring to Strong’s belief that the expert qualification requirement 
“was a substantial barrier to junk science”—“the qualification of the 
expert presumptively qualifies the technique,” Giannelli argued that 
“[t]his formulation of the relevancy approach makes the trial court 
too dependent on the testifying expert.”105  Giannelli’s rejection of 
the relevancy approach is also based on three other factors.  First, he 
finds “‘weighing’ probative value against factors such as misleading 
the jury . . . frequently illusory,” noting that a judge believing a 
scientific technique to be “reliable (when it is not) . . . will not 
appreciate its misleading character.”106  Second, Professor Giannelli 
makes the point that 403’s bias toward admissibility “further erode[s] 
the barriers to admissibility.”107  Third, Giannelli finds troubling the 
“abuse of discretion” standard of review of trial court rulings saying 
that “[u]nder this approach, it would not be wrong for one trial 
judge to admit polygraph evidence while another judge excluded it. . 
. .  This approach is inconsistent with Daubert, which I believe is more 
demanding.”108  Professor Giannelli goes on to note Daubert’s 
imposition of an independent assessment obligation upon the trial 
judge despite the expert’s claims of reliability and the Court’s 
willingness “to pay the price for a demanding standard, by noting that 
‘inevitably on occasion [its approach] will prevent the jury from 
 
evidence principle.  Id. at 223. 
 102 Giannelli, supra note 11. 
 103 Id. at 2009-10. 
 104 Id. at 2010 (quoting John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 22) (emphasis added). 
 105 Id. at 2010-11. 
 106 Id. at 2011. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Giannelli, supra note 11, at 2011. 
  
2003 RELIABILITY UNDER RULE 702 307 
learning of authentic insights and innovations.’”109 
Daubert and its progeny show that Professor Giannelli’s concerns 
do not discredit approaching reliability under 702 as an aspect of 
probative value.  First, Daubert rejects the notion that expertise alone 
establishes the reliability of expert testimony.  In fact, even though 
the Court acknowledged the impressive credentials of Petitioners’ 
eight experts, it remanded the case for a determination of reliability 
based on the Daubert factors.110  Second, if a mistaken reliability 
finding prevents the judge from appreciating whether the jury is 
misled, it would seem to make little difference whether such a finding 
is deemed to be an aspect of probative value under a 403 analysis or 
an independent requirement under 702.  In either case the reliability 
finding (mistaken though it is) would lead to admission.  Third, even 
though 403 favors admissibility, the Daubert Court makes it clear that 
simple relevancy is different from reliability.111  The reliability factors 
call for sufficient probative value to offset (I argue under the 403 
standard) the inherently unfair prejudice and other risk factors (both 
inherent and case-specific) that characterize expert testimony.  
Importantly, unlike the 403 analysis of non-expert testimony,112 the 
proponent of expert testimony has the burden of proving reliability, 
i.e. sufficient probative value.113  This makes the specialized 
application more demanding than the routine 403 balancing rule.114  
Finally, having the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we know that the trial 
court’s reliability determination, like the 403 determination, is 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard that insulates a judge’s 
decision to admit or exclude evidence.115 
In their excellent treatise, Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and 
Sanders noted that the Daubert Court “devoted relatively little 
attention to the balance of probative value and unfair prejudice 
encapsulated in Rule 403.”116  They suggested that “this Rule might 
prove to be one of the most important tools lower courts have for 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598. 
 111 See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 112 See supra note 71. 
 113 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-97; see 1 SALTZBURG, supra note 71, § 104.02[9]. 
 114 But see Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s 
Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000) (tracing the current excess of trial court 
discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence to James Bradley Thayer and 
specifically criticizing the losses in consistency, predictability, and integrity of our 
adjudication caused by the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho decisions). 
 115 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
 116 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.8. 
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managing scientific evidence.”117  They posit a case where the judge 
might decide under 702 and 104(a) that the proponent has 
established the validity of the evidence by a preponderance of the 
evidence but believe that “it is not valid enough, in light of the 
dangers associated with its use.”118  This approach exemplifies the role 
of reliability as an aspect of probative value, whose sufficiency is a 
function of the dangers associated with the use of expert testimony.119 
Kumho makes it clear that there is “no relevant distinction” in 
reliability analysis between scientific, technical and other specialized 
knowledge.120  It is also clear that reliability assessment requires 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id.  Even though the results of a polygraph examination present a prime 
example of the kind of technology that is regulated through 403 balancing, the 
authors add that “[v]irtually all other forms of scientific evidence present similar 
difficulties and opportunities.”  Id.  The authors say the following about polygraphy 
in the context of 403 analysis: 
Although the research supporting the validity of polygraphy remains 
controversial, significant research has been conducted on the validity 
and reliability of polygraph tests.  Despite the flaws associated with this 
research, a court could reasonably conclude that some form of 
polygraphy was more likely than not valid.  But few courts, if any, would 
complete their scrutiny there. 
 
Polygraphy is potentially awesome technique that might displace 
jurors’ traditional task of evaluating credibility.  A large percentage of 
courts and observers fear the overwhelming impact polygraphy might 
have, causing jurors to overlook the significant errors associated with 
even the best application of the technology.  The regulation of this 
technology is largely accomplished through the balancing mechanism 
provided by 403. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 119 The approach suggested here differs from that of Faigman, since it views 702 
gatekeeping as a part of 403 analysis, rather than being in lockstep.  Under this view, 
any required adjustment in the showing of validity is made in light of the 403 
dangers.  This analysis is similar to Nance’s comparative reliability of better evidence 
approach; however, the existence of better evidence is only one factor in the 403 
balance.  Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.8 n.230 (“Rule 403 only comes into 
play if the court finds that the evidence is ‘sufficiently’ reliable under Rule 702.  
Thus, Rule 403 provides additional power to keep evidence out after Rule 702 
gatekeeping is done.  Yet, if the Rule 702 threshold is substantially higher than mere 
relevancy, then the courts’ ability to adjust the showing of validity to the use and 
context of the evidence is limited.”). 
 120 526 U.S. at 147.  As Faigman says: 
In asking whether the expertise is “science” or “non-science,” courts 
have asked the wrong question.  Rather, in all cases where expert 
testimony is proffered courts should be inquiring into the methods 
experts are using, whether expert judgments are based on 
experimental research, clinical evaluation, or other types of 
experience. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5, at 41. 
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neither proof of the accuracy of expert testimony nor exclusion of  
“shaky evidence,” leaving the question of how much reliability is 
enough.121  The trial court’s analysis should focus on whether the 
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to offset the dangers 
associated with the testimony.122  Though this sufficiency approach 
should consider the availability of better evidence as suggested by 
Professor Nance, the existence of such evidence should not be the 
sole determinant of probative value.123  This approach also suggests 
that smaller degrees of reliability may be tolerable, where associated 
dangers are lower, posing a lower threat to accuracy in factfinding.124 
THE POLYGRAPH CASES 
Under the 403 approach, expert testimony that is not sufficiently 
supported by the data or that amounts to unsupported speculation 
lacks sufficient probative value to justify time and risk of 
overvaluation that its production might entail.125  Hence, the cases 
may be examined against three tests that reveal the link between 
reliability and 403 analysis.  First, admissibility decisions that analyze 
reliable testimony as admissible and unreliable testimony as 
inadmissible under 403 tend to substantiate reliability analysis as a 
specialized application of 403.  Second, the exclusion of reliable 
testimony under 403 would suggest a distinction between reliability 
and 403 analysis.  Third, the converse is also true—the admission of 
expert testimony under a 403 analysis despite a finding of 
unreliability would demonstrate a distinction between reliability and 
403 analysis. 
The polygraph cases most dramatically demonstrate the 
demands that 403 places on reliability.  The exemplary case showing 
the connection between reliability and 403 analysis is United States v. 
Lea.126  In that case a criminal defendant challenged the trial court’s 
exclusion of exculpatory polygraph evidence in part because the 
 
 121 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
 122 Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5.1 (defining sufficiency as “how much 
evidence it takes before we believe a certain proposition”). 
 123 Some combination of the Daubert and 702 factors will help determine 
probative value. See Faigman, supra note 78, at 261 (arguing that judges should ask 
“whether better evidence should be available”) (emphasis in original). 
 124 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5.1. (noting that courts appear to be 
expecting better research in criminal cases, “the more likely the jury is to be 
overwhelmed by the expert opinion”). 
 125 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that opinion 
connected with data only by ipse dixit or involving “too great an analytical gap 
between the data and the opinion proffered” may lack reliability). 
 126 249 F.3d 632, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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judge had performed a reliability rather than a 403 analysis.  The 
defendant had been convicted and sentenced to 36 months 
imprisonment, a year of supervised release, and restitution in the 
amount of $2.2 million for the sabotage of a former business 
associate’s business product that had resulted in losses of $2.5 
million.  The defense had been that an employee of the former 
associate had committed the sabotage and not the defendant.  Part of 
the defendant’s proof was the opinion of a polygraph examiner that 
the employee’s answers to the polygraph examination about his 
involvement in the sabotage indicated deception.  However, the 
examiner had been unable to conduct a post-examination interview 
with the employee, because he had refused to participate.  After 
questioning the examiner the trial court excluded the opinion on the 
grounds that the examiner had “failed to establish the reliability of 
[the examiner’s] opinion resulting from his polygraph examination 
of [the employee].”127  The trial court had found that the examiner 
“could only speculate as to the accuracy of the polygraph 
examination he had performed,” and was “unaware of whether there 
were any known statistics on the accuracy rate of the methodology 
employed in examining [the employee].”128 
On appeal, based on an earlier Seventh Circuit decision holding 
that trial courts must determine the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence by delicately balancing 403 factors, the defendant in Lea 
argued that exclusion could only be based on Rule 403 factors and 
that the trial court had inappropriately excluded the evidence 
because of reliability concerns.129  This argument forced the Seventh 
Circuit to address the relationship between 702 reliability and 403 
analysis.  Conceding the defendant’s point about the applicability of 
403, the Seventh Circuit said the following: 
While our recent case law has not explicitly retained the notion 
that reliability concerns can factor into the admissibility decision, 
we note that 403 allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant 
evidence if the probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the 
danger of . . . misleading the jury.’130 
Citing the concerns about the “aura of infallibility attending 
polygraph evidence” and misled juries as well as juries giving 
 
 127 Id. at 637. 
 128 Id. at 637-38 
 129 See United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1480 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When dealing 
with the admissibility of polygraph evidence, and the accuracy thereof, the trial court 
must engage in a delicate balancing of many factors including probative value, 
prejudicial effect, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and undue delay.”). 
 130 Lea, 249 F.3d at 639. 
  
2003 RELIABILITY UNDER RULE 702 311 
excessive weight to polygrapher opinions, the court continued:131 
Such concerns are undoubtedly heightened when the reliability 
of the particular examination is called into question.  As the 
reliability of the evidence decreases, the likelihood increases that 
the probative value may be substantially outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect.  Thus, while reliability is an explicitly 
referenced concern that is appropriately discussed in a Daubert 
framework, the issue may also become an integral part of a 403 
inquiry.132 
The court also referenced as consistent with this analysis one of its 
earlier decisions where “[t]he court had examined the reliability 
concerns under the Daubert framework, and determined that the 
‘reliability problems rendered the probative value minimal . . . 
[while] there was a danger that the jury would consider the 
polygraph test to be conclusive regarding [the witness’s] veracity.’”133  
The Lea court noted that the trial court had used Daubert as a guide 
to focus on the known or potential error rate and considered the 
examiner’s inability to complete the examination.  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that “[t]hose factors reduced the reliability of [the 
examiner’s] opinion, tipping the balance under Rule 403 in favor of 
exclusion.”134 
Like the Seventh Circuit cases, United States v. Posado,135 United 
States v. Cordoba,136 and United States v. Waters137 are three post-Daubert 
cases that demonstrate the 403 link to reliability.  Each of these cases 
involved the criminal defendant’s proffer of exculpatory polygraph 
evidence.  In Posado, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s refusal 
to conduct a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of the polygraph 
examiner’s expert testimony.  The court noted the “tremendous 
advances in polygraph instrumentation and technique in the years 
since Frye” and set forth Daubert’s interpretation of the reliability 
requirement under 702.  The court ultimately remanded the case to 
 
 131 The Lea court noted that the Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 
303 (1998), voiced these concerns. 
 132 Lea, 249 F.3d at 639. 
 133 Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 154 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 1998)).  In 
Taylor, the trial court had specifically pointed to the reliability problem caused by the 
examiner’s use of “‘stock’ questions in the test rather than questions tailored to the 
circumstances of [the] case [and] a subjective visual scoring technique in calculating 
the results rather than the more reliable objective numerical scoring system.”  154 
F.3d at 683. 
 134 Lea, 249 F.3d at 639. 
 135 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 136 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 137 194 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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the trial court for a determination of the relevance and reliability of 
the polygraph evidence, but it removed the per se barrier.  It also 
cited the evidence in support of the examination’s accuracy: (a) the 
office of technology assessment studies showing accuracy rates of 58-
98 percent and higher, and (b) other studies and rates higher than 
90%.  Based on these figures the court assumed reliability and 
proceeded to demonstrate what factors should be considered in the 
403 analysis, including the mesmerizing prejudicial effect.138  It 
considered such probative factors as the opportunity extended to the 
prosecutor to participate in the examination, offering the evidence in 
a pre-trial setting before a judge rather than in a trial before the jury, 
and the credibility problem giving rise to a need for the evidence.  
Following this exercise, the court announced that it was leaving it up 
to the trial court to determine reliability and relevance. 
The court’s approach in assuming reliability before proceeding 
to a 403 analysis in Posado suggests a distinction between 702 and 403 
analysis.  Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Lea, the court in Posado did 
not specifically incorporate the reliability factor into its assessment of 
probative value.  Rather, it treated various procedural safeguards—
the prosecutor’s participation in the examination and the offering of 
the evidence initially in the pre-trial setting—as contributing to 
probative value.  However, if these safeguards are seen as 
contributing to the accuracy of exam results, as the court suggested, 
they contribute to probative value by enhancing reliability.  The court 
in Posado may not have fully appreciated this relationship.  The need 
for evidence may certainly heighten its value; but it does not obviate 
balancing the unfair prejudice associated with such evidence.  In the 
case of expert testimony, reliability must still be sufficient to offset 
policy counterweights under 403, even in the face of heightened 
need.139 
In United States v. Cordoba, the trial court ruled the polygraph 
evidence inadmissible under 702, because it contained defects under 
industry standards.  In that case, the duration and substance of the 
pre-test was not preserved, no tape or video was made of the pre-test 
interview or the polygraph exam, the examiner did not calibrate the 
 
 138 The court referred to this effect as the traditional objection to polygraph 
evidence; the Supreme Court in Scheffer described it as  “the aura of infallibility 
attending polygraph evidence [that] can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess 
credibility and guilt.”  523 U.S. at 314. 
 139 See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[W]hile 
prosecutorial need alone does not mean probative value outweighs prejudice, the 
more essential the evidence, the greater its probative value, and the less likely that a 
trial court should order the evidence excluded.”). 
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machine at the prison test site, and the questions were improper.  
Moreover, even though the examiner found deception in the 
defendant’s answer, the examiner scored the answer truthful after 
the defendant’s explanation.  Finally, the examiner’s report was filled 
with errors and defects and was completed before the test, and 
numerous other problems existed. 
In doing the 403 analysis in Cordoba, the court of appeals 
pointed to the flawed exam as lacking probative value.  The factors 
that rendered the exam unreliable under 702 also made it less 
probative under 403.  The court also noted that the risks associated 
with such a flawed exam “greatly outweighed the probative value.”140  
Cordoba shows completely overlapping reliability and probative value 
inquiries under 702 and 403. 
In Waters the court bypassed 702 and “independently” excluded 
the evidence under 403.  It is noteworthy that in that case the 
proponent produced no evidence of the reliability of the polygraph 
evidence.  Thus, the non-existence of probative value facilitated the 
trial court’s 403 decision to exclude.  Noting the concern in Scheffer 
about  “excessive weight,” the trial court had called the evidence 
collateral and confusing. 
In polygraph cases, the “aura of infallibility” that would cause the 
jury to overvalue the evidence sets a high bar for establishing 
sufficient reliability.  As Professors Giannelli and Imwinkelried point 
out in their treatise on scientific evidence, “[t]he validity of 
polygraph testing in criminal investigations remains controversial.”141 
Yet, polygraph research is ongoing.  The director of the Defense 
Polygraph Institute noted in 1995, “the period between 1986 and the 
present has been one of unparalleled advances in the 
psychophysiological detection of deception testing procedures and 
processes.”142  Validation studies conducted by the now-defunct Office 
of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress, the 
Department of Defense, and others show accuracy rates in criminal 
investigations ranging from 63 to 96 percent, depending upon 
whether one is confirming truthful answers (higher), or deceptive 
answers (lower), and whether interpretations were blind or by the 
original examiner.143 
These observations suggest that under a specialized 403 inquiry 
 
 140 Cordoba, 194 F.3d at 1063. 
 141 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 8-3 (3d 
ed. 1999). 
 142 1 Id.  
 143 See 1 id. § 8-3(C), at 381-82. 
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based on a reliability showing of probative value, the admissibility of 
polygraph evidence may well become routine as its accuracy rates 
continue to rise.  With unfair prejudice as high as that associated with 





The 403 approach to determining reliability is certainly not 
perfect.  In fact, Eleanor Swift, harkening back to Thayer, criticized 
excessive discretion in the area of expert testimony as leading to the 
loss of consistency and predictability in making reliability decisions.144  
She points, critically, to all the flexibility and potential for 
inconsistency under Daubert and Kumho, combined with Joiner’s 
“abuse of discretion” standard.145 
She also expresses the concern that judges may inappropriately 
define substantive law by controlling the use of essential scientific 
testimony.  For example, judges might create a bright-line 
requirement that without published epidemiological studies which 
confirm a causal link between the alleged toxic substance and the 
plaintiff’s medical condition, expert testimony that such a link exists 
will be excluded.146  One could certainly argue that appellate courts 
or legislatures, rather than trial judges insulated from judicial review 
by an “abuse of discretion” standard, should be adding this kind of 
substantive term.  Swift argues that an “abuse of discretion” standard 
should not hamper efforts to deal with the policy question of how to 
reconcile the tension between the right to jury trial and the need to 
use expertise at trials.147 
However, Professor Swift acknowledges the arguments of 
commentators that in some ways judicial discretion may be more 
appropriate than bright-line rules in dealing with the dynamics of the 
trial.  Many questions coming up in litigation require “individualized, 
flexible decision-making” within the context of a particular case.148  
Where cases involve narrow facts that resist generalization, trying to 
apply rigid rules would promote error and injustice.149  When it is 
important to take the trial context into account, trial courts are in a 
 
 144 See Swift, supra note 114, at 2467. 
 145 Id. at 2472-73. 
 146 Id. at 2473. 
 147 Id. at 2446 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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superior position to appellate courts and to legislatures, and rules 
allowing the trial judge to exercise sensitivity to the complexity and 
uniqueness of a particular case necessarily promote more truth than 
mechanical rules.150 
It may be true that standards governing the admissibility of 
expert testimony may not be appropriate for the exercise of 
discretion, since these admissibility decisions transcend the individual 
case.  Yet, currently, that is not an open policy question.  The 
reliability standard embodied in 702 as amended and interpreted by 
the court is a given.  Recognizing its provenance in 403 does at least 
two things.  First, it leads to the recognition that even though the 
standard is variable, there is a threshold of reliability in every case.  
Second, it reveals that reliability under 403 may be established in 
some cases without reference to better evidence.  Conversely, in some 
cases as demonstrated by the polygraph cases, it may well mean not 
just better evidence, but the best evidence. 
The beauty of understanding reliability as a specialized 
application of 403 is that it establishes a connection with basic 
evidence principles as we move into this area of increasing 
complexity.  It intertwines reliability with probative value and focuses 
on admissibility as distinctive from sufficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 403 is a governor that requires more than minimal 
relevancy when evidence presents risks to accuracy in factfinding or 
judicial efficiency.  However, 403 does not exclude evidence whose 
probative value is high enough to offset countervailing risks.151  Since 
reliability contributes to the probative value of specialized knowledge, 
even highly risky expert testimony such as polygraph results will be 
admitted under 403 upon a showing of sufficiently high reliability.  
Conversely, if expert testimony presents little risk, probative value 
need not be as high in order to scale the 403 hurdle.  Indeed, expert 
testimony may be “shaky but admissible.”152 
Because expert testimony carries inherent risks, Rule 702 
requires sufficient reliability—substantially more than minimal 
 
 150 Swift, supra note 114, at 2444, 2446; see also Kevin C. McMunigal & Calvin 
William Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 363, 380 (2001) 
(discussing the preference for a discretionary approach to extrinsic impeachment 
rather than a bright line rule based partially on relative institutional competence). 
 151 See Blakely, supra note 49, at 317. 
 152 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
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relevancy—for admissibility.153  How much more depends upon the 
countervailing level of risk to be offset.  This is why the reliability 
standard is so often articulated in variable terms—as perhaps a 
sliding scale without markers.154  Viewed as a specialized application 
of 403, the reliability determination under 702 is broad enough to 
encompass Professor Nance’s better evidence concerns, while 
accounting for a myriad of risks, some, perhaps, so substantial as to 
call for the best evidence. 
 
 
 153 The “any tendency” standard of Rule 401 defines minimal relevancy.  See FED. 
R. EVID. 401. 
 154 See Nance supra note 39, at 221 (referencing to “an ascending scale of 
reliability with a mark that separates the insufficiently reliable from the sufficiently 
reliable”). 
